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I. ISSUE ORIENTATION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENFORCING
LOCAL JUDGMENTS
One of the most basic attributes of a functional legal system
involves its capacity to secure rapid and comprehensive compli-
ance with validly entered orders and judgments. A high degree of
effectiveness in this regard is beneficial insofar as it underscores
the power and legitimacy of the State and its constituent branches
and institutions, deters future wrongdoing (i.e., by bolstering the
elemental concept that wrongdoers will be held accountable for
their actions), and protects the rights and interests of those indi-
viduals and/or entities that elect to conduct their affairs within
the parameters of the law. Legal systems that operate along these
lines are, ultimately, self-reinforcing. That is, the more successful
a State is at compelling its citizens to comply with the dictates of
positive law, the easier it becomes to effectively and cheaply bring
enforcement actions against the few individuals that persist in
violating same.
Legal systems which are not, alternatively, capable of giving
effect to their official pronouncements run the risk of experiencing
reduced levels of public confidence in State institutions and
actors, forgone productive activity (tied to the expenditure of time
required for the pursuit of justice), a diminished willingness on
the part of creditors to lend (and then only at rates adjusted for an
elevated degree of risk), and, given the high level of attendant
legal uncertainty, difficulty in attracting and retaining foreign
investment and technology transfers. These outcomes are, in
turn, detrimental to the extent that they dilute the legitimacy of
formal law, leave individuals inclined to structure their affairs
around the government,1 mitigate against the liberal formation of
"arms length" business relationships (i.e., those not premised on
the existence of a previously established inter-personal or familial
relationship), and adversely impact national development and
competitiveness.
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE IFES-CIDE STUDY
Cognizant of the fundamental inter-relationship between the
capacity of a nation's legal system to assure compliance with its
1. Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto makes a similar contention when he
notes that a reduction in the enforcement capacity of a government will provide
individuals with an "incentive to follow their own interests, regardless of any paper
constraints." HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 170 (2000) (hereinafter
"MYSTERY").
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orders and decisions, the rule of law, and the joint prospect of
democratic governance and sustainable economic growth, the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems ("IFES"), acting in
conjunction with its Mexican partner, the Centro de Investigaci6n
y Docencia Econ6micas ("CIDE"), undertook the present study for
the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of the procedures and
mechanisms which exist for the enforcement of local civil and com-
mercial judgments in Mexico.2 Pursuant to the original research
plan, the findings of the present study are to be incorporated into
a database, the existence of which will facilitate the realization of
cross-cultural comparisons regarding the issue of the enforcement
of judgments and the formulation of a future series of judgment
enforcement enhancing recommendations.
A. Methodology
The study was carried out in October and November of 2002
and involved the use of both qualitative and quantitative research
techniques. With respect to the former technique, a three person
IFES-CIDE team of civil and common law trained lawyers con-
ducted fourteen in-depth interviews with a combination of Mexico
City based law firms, judicial officials, and non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") during the week of 28 October - 1 Novem-
ber (see Annex I for the names of the parties consulted during this
phase of the investigation). These interviews, many of which
lasted for several hours, provided the team of investigators with a
valuable substantive orientation to the subject of the enforcement
of judgments and arbitral awards in Mexico.
The insights and impressions gained through the aforemen-
tioned meetings were supplemented by a forty-one question sur-
vey encompassing (i) the effectiveness of Mexico's system for
enforcing judgments and (ii) the obstacles to enforcement. Using
2. The enforcement of local administrative, criminal, and family court judgments
were not considered in this study. Nor did the study take into consideration the
enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. For information on the
subject of the enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards in Mexico, see
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York's July 2001 Survey on Foreign
Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments available at http://www.brownwelsh.com/
Archive/ABCNY_-StudyEnforcingJudgments.pdf; Jorge Vargas, Enforcement of
Judgments in Mexico: The 1988 Rules of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure, 14 NW.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 376 (1994); Ryan G. Anderson, Transnational Litigation Involving
Mexican Parties, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1059 (1994); Lisa C. Thompson, International
Dispute Resolution in the United States and Mexico: A Practical Guide to Terms,
Arbitration Clauses, and the Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards, 24
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1 (1997).
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a team of seventeen specially trained CIDE interviewers, the
close-questioned survey was, in the majority of cases,3 personally
administered to a randomly selected set of Mexico City based law-
yers (fifty-eight), judges (thirty-two), and court officials (thirty-
five). Data collected through these interviews was subsequently
coded and entered by CIDE personnel into a SPSS database. The
frequencies and cross-tabs pertaining to this database are set
forth in Annex II.
4
B. Study Limitations
The value of the findings presented in this study are tem-
pered by two distinct considerations. The first concerns sample
size. While the relatively small number of respondents utilized in
the study precludes the articulation of far-reaching conclusions,
the sample is large enough to permit the detection of relevant pat-
terns and the making of meaningful observations. Future
research carried out in furtherance of this project should prioritize
the amplification of the base sample size. The second considera-
tion concerns the utility of these findings in light of Mexico's eco-
nomic and legal reality. It must, in this connection, be recognized
that Mexican lawyers and judges typically work with matters
which arise from the experience of individuals and/or entities that
are part of the "formal" economy. This situation is significant in
that an estimated 55% of Mexico's economically productive popu-
lation labors in what is commonly referred to as the "informal"
economy.5 Taking the aforementioned facts under consideration,
it must be recognized that this study, to the extent that it does not
take into account the extra-legal obligation compliance practices
and mechanisms of the informal economy, can only be counted on
to provide a partial view of the enforcement aspects of Mexico's
larger transactional and commercial reality.
3. The survey was personally administered in 96.8% of cases. It was, for reasons
beyond the control of interviewers, self-administered in 3.2% of cases. A personalized
form of survey administration was adopted as a means of cutting down on the
possibility of an intended respondent (for example, a busy judge) delegating the task
of answering the questions to a third party (for example, a clerk).
4. The volume of these materials precludes inclusion for publication. Annex II
remains on file with the authors.
5. An estimated 25 million Mexicans make their living in the informal economy.
A 1998 INEGI study indicates that up to 12% of Mexico's GDP derives informally
conducted economic activity. These figures are expected to increase in response to the
currently declining rates of economic growth and formal sector employment. Mario
Lopez, Los Reyes de la Calle, CAMBIO, Jan. 6, 2002, at 62.
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C. Organization of the Study
The first part of this paper sets forth a brief overview of the
legal framework that exists in Mexico for the enforcement of judg-
ments. The purpose of including such an overview is to provide a
general sense of how the judgment enforcement process is sup-
posed to work. The second part of this paper descriptively ana-
lyzes the quantitative data derived from the survey, together with
information obtained through the qualitative interviews. The pri-
mary objective of this part of the work is to empirically identify
and understand the disconnects which exist within Mexico
between (i) the de jure and de facto procedures and mechanisms
utilized for the enforcement of judgments in the formal sector and
(ii) the perceptions of the various actors involved in the formal sec-
tor judgment enforcement process. The paper concludes by mak-
ing a series of recommendations, the adoption of which would
strengthen the procedures and mechanisms used for the enforce-
ment of judgments in Mexico.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF
LOCAL JUDGMENTS IN MEXICO
Mexico's C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal,6 C6digo Fed-
eral de Procedimientos Civiles, and C6digo de Comercio contain
provisions addressing the enforcement of judgments with respect
to ordinary and executive proceedings. Although these provisions
are not identical, they are, for the purpose of providing this basic
overview, sufficiently similar to justify a combined consideration.
A. Basic Steps Involved in the Enforcement of Local
Judgments in Mexico
The judgment enforcement process begins with the pro-
nouncement of a final sentence,9 coupled with the issuance of an
"auto de ejecuci6n" (i.e., a writ of execution). Debtors are, as a
matter of law and public policy, afforded the opportunity for vol-
untary compliance. Debtors that refuse to act in accordance with
a court's judgment will consequently have an amount of property
6. COD. PROC. Civ. D. F. (Mex. 1928) (hereinafter "C.P.C.D.F.).
7. COD. FED. PROC. Civ. (Mex. 1943 (hereinafter "C.F.P.C.).
8. COD. COM. (Mex. 1889). Lagunae in the C6digo de Comercio and related
mercantile laws are filled by the common law associated with Mexico's civil codes.
9. The concept of a final sentence is developed in arts. 426-429 of the C.P.C.D.F
and arts. 354-357 of the C.F.P.C.
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embargoed ° equivalent to the value of the underlying debt and
costs.1 Embargoes are carried out by "actuaries"" backed up by
local police, if necessary, and subject to (i) code based debt satis-
faction asset orders, 3 (ii) the debtor's right to designate, within
limits, which goods are to be embargoed, 4 and (iii) certain
exempted categories of property.15 A "depositario"6  may be
appointed to safeguard embargoed items/property.
In the course of an ordinary civil or commercial proceeding,
the next step in the judgment enforcement process entails the
obtainment of an expert's appraisal of the property. The procedu-
ral flow associated with executive civil and commercial proceed-
ings is, it should be noted, slightly different in that it permits a
debtor to oppose an embargo on certain code based grounds.'7
Where an attempted opposition to a pending executive embargo
proves unsuccessful, the court will proceed to issue an order for
the expert determination of the property's value, along with a
"sentencia de remate" (i.e., a judicial order of sale by public
auction).
Valid notice and registration having, respectively, been given
and accomplished, the sale by public auction of a debtor's property
is conducted from the judge's chambers and under his or her direct
supervision. Should the first round of bidding not produce an
acceptable purchase offer (two-thirds of the appraised value), 8 the
judgment creditor can request the scheduling of up to two addi-
tional auctions.
Assuming the ultimate establishment of an acceptable sale
price (and the debtor's continued unwillingness to pay), the Judge
will approve the transaction, order the preparation of any docu-
mentation necessary for the subsequent transfer of ownership,
and assess the expenses and costs of the proceeding. The amount
10. The common law analogue to a civil law "embargo" would be a writ of
attachment.
11. See C.P.C.D.F., supra note 6, art. 534; C.F.P.C., supra note 7, art. 401; COD.
COM., supra note 8, art. 1392.
12. An "actuario" is the officer and employee of the court responsible for, inter alia,
executing judgments.
13. See C.P.C.D.F., supra note 6, art. 536; C.F.P.C., supra note 7, art. 436; C6D.
COM, supra note 8, art. 1395.
14. See C.P.C.D.F., supra note 6, art. 536; C.F.P.C., supra note 7, art. 437.
15. See C.P.C.D.F., supra note 6, art. 544; C.F.P.C., supra note 7, art. 434.
16. A "depositario" is a third party that is either appointed or selected to safeguard
embargoed property.
17. See C.P.C.D.F., supra note 6, art. 453; COD. COM., supra note 8, art. 1403.
18. See C.P.C.D.F., supra note 6, arts. 582 and 586.
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of time required to complete the judgment enforcement process
typically varies in accordance with the nature of (i) the relation-
ship of the parties, (ii) the prior case history, and (iii) the underly-
ing subject matter. This said, however, the C.P.C.D.F. provides a
ten-year statute of limitations.19
IV. PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE FINDINGS
The analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data collected
revolves around two central themes: (i) the effectiveness of Mex-
ico's system for enforcing judgments and (ii) the obstacles which
exist to the enforcement of judgments in Mexico. The initial find-
ings with respect to these themes are set forth in the following
sections.
A. The Effectiveness of Mexico's System for Enforcing
Judgments
1. Perceptions Regarding the Effectiveness of the System
in Specific Contexts
Mexico's legal system is considered by a majority of respon-
dents (47.1%) to provide an effective means for collecting judicially
recognized debts. Within this overall percentage, judges (50.0%)
expressed a stronger faith in the effectiveness of Mexico's system
for enforcing judicially recognized judgments than attorneys
(42.1%).20 In line with this finding, a majority of respondents
(60.2%) expressed their experience-borne belief that between 60-
90% of judicially recognized debts can be collected through the
Mexican legal system.2'
In spite of the fact that respondent perceptions regarding the
effectiveness of Mexico's system for enforcing judgments are gen-
erally positive, variability is noted in relation to specific types of
cases. For example, the system was viewed as being more effec-
tive with respect to the enforcement of judgments against small or
medium sized entities (48.8%) as compared to those against large
corporations (37.6%).22 Focusing, alternatively, on the individual
debtor, survey respondents indicated that Mexico's legal system
19. Id. art. 529. Said statute of limitations runs from the moment a judgment
becomes final.
20. See Table I.
21. Annex II, supra note 4.
22. Id.
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was more effective in terms of enforcing judgments involving
smaller (56.8%) as opposed to larger (39.2%) claims.23 Regarding
the latter type of case, it is not surprising to see perceptions of
system effectiveness vary in accordance with the size of the under-
lying debt owed.
2. Effectiveness Attributed to Different Methods of
Enforcing Judgments
The fundamental methods available for and considerations
bearing on the enforcement of judgments in Mexico include, inter
alia, judicial execution, extra-judicial negotiation, the impairment
of a debtor's good commercial reputation, and the use of threats
and/or violence. When asked to rank these methods and consider-
ations in order of their effectiveness, respondents expressed an
overwhelming preference for judicial enforcement (64.0%).24 Con-
sistent with qualitative comments made to the IFES-CIDE team
of investigators regarding the diminished significance of concilia-
tion/mediation in the Mexican judgment enforcement process,
respondents ranked "negotiation with a debtor" as the second
most effective enforcement strategy. In this connection, 43.4% of
respondents indicated that between 30-65% of a debt could be
recovered by negotiating.25 The tactic considered to be the third
most effective means of judgment enforcement involved the
impairment of a debtor's commercial reputation. Notwithstand-
ing the relevance of this consideration to corporations anywhere in
the world, the necessity of preserving a good commercial reputa-
tion takes on an elevated degree of significance in light of the
increased importance attributed to the formation and mainte-
nance of family and/or inter-personally based business relation-
ships in Mexico.26 The final judgment enforcement method
involves the use of threats and/or violence. While the empirical
23. Id.
24. See Table I.
25. Annex II, supra note 4.
26. The existence of this phenomenon has been attributed to the low levels of
confidence and trust that Latin Americans have in their public institutions and fellow
citizens. Marta Lagos, Public Opinion in New Democracies: Latin America's Smiling
Mask, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 128 (1997); Benito Jimenez, Desconfian los Mexicanos de
Politicos e Instituciones, REFORMA, Aug. 15, 2002, at 7A. In what constitutes both a
manifestation of the widespread regional conviction that "others can not be counted
on" and a hedge against having to rely on unreliable and slow judiciaries, businesses
in low trust societies (such as Mexico) tend to be centered on family and/or long-
standing personal relationships. Ilya Adler, A Family Affair, Bus. MEx., Oct. 1998, at
18.
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manifestation of this concept is certainly less dramatic than the
impression imparted by Mexican judicial and legal professionals
during qualitative interviews (such interviews produced, for
example, vivid accounts of armed resistance and intervention,
politically and/or socially organized opposition,27 retaliatory
destruction, etc.), the fact that 22.4% of respondents resorted on
either a regular or occasional basis to violent judgment enforce-
ment methods speaks in a troubled way to the perceived short-
comings of the legal system and the lingering willingness of
Mexicans - in the absence of any other viable alternative - to take
justice into their own hands.2
Where a creditor determines to forego judicial enforcement of
a judgment, the primary reasons cited in support of such a deci-
sion are (i) the high cost and (ii) the time and delay associated
with enforcement proceedings. Regarding the latter point, law-
yers (27.6%) are more inclined to perceive the issue of time and
delay as constituting a valid justification for not using Mexican
courts for the enforcement of judgments than their judicial coun-
terparts (21.9%).29
3. Perceptions Regarding Role Allocation and Mission
Compliance
An overwhelming majority of survey respondents indicated
that the delineation of institutional roles and responsibilities is
not an obstacle to the effective operation of Mexico's judgment
enforcement system. This said, however, respondents also indi-
27. The United Nation's Special Rapporteur charged with the responsibility of
investigating the themes of independence and impunity with respect to the
administration of justice in Mexico picked up on the same basic issue (at the state
level), noting in his Mar. 2002 report that "in many civil cases, court judgments
remained unenforced due to opposition of either the parties or social organizations."
U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 11(d), at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2002/72/Add.1 (2002) (hereinafter "UNSR").
28. This observation calls to mind the way certain Mexican towns and villages
have, upon losing faith in the capacity of the judicial system to deliver justice, acted
repeatedly to bypass established institutions and procedures and administer their
own brand of justice. Servando Torres and Omar Castillo, Linchan a Dos en Milpa
Alta, REFORMA, Dec. 6, 2002, at 1B (noting that the inhabitants of towns and villages
in the vicinity of Mexico City have taken justice into their own hands - sometimes
with fatal results - six times over the course of the past three years); Daniel
Pensamiento, Rescatan a Dos "Delincuentes" de Ser Linchados en Chiapas, REFORMA,
Dec. 14, 2002, at 18A (noting way in which a local mob was, at the last minute,
prevented from burning and stoning to death two presumed criminals in Chiapas);
Alertan Sobre Riesgo de Ingobernalidad, REFORMA, Oct. 4, 2002, at 4A.
29. Annex II, supra note 4.
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cated that not all entities involved in the judgment enforcement
process "usually" comply with their obligations. In an observation
that tracks comments made by both judges and lawyers during
qualitative interviews, 60% of respondents expressed their opin-
ion that meaningful police assistance could not regularly be
assured in conjunction with the enforcement of judgments. 0
B. Obstacles to the Enforcement of Judgments
1. Legal Obstacles to the Enforcement of Judgments
The primary obstacle of a legal nature to the enforcement of
judgments according to 19.2% of respondents involves a debtor's
fraudulent transfer of property. In what constitutes an interest-
ing difference of perspective as between "bench" and "bar" (to the
extent that these concepts can be meaningfully used in Mexico),
attorneys are more than twice as likely as judges to view the pos-
sibility of a fraudulent transfer as a legal obstacle to the judgment
enforcement process. 1
IFES-CIDE investigators learned through qualitative inter-
views with judges and attorneys that two basic strategies exist in
Mexico for attacking fraudulent transfers of property: the "acciwn
Pauliana" (Revacatory action) and the initiation of a criminal pro-
ceeding. According to these same sources, the latter strategy rep-
resents the best chance of undoing a debtor's fraudulent transfer
insofar as the former is rarely used.
Secondary and tertiary obstacles of a legal nature to the
enforcement of judgments identified by respondents include the
difficulty of (i) providing a debtor with required notifications and
(ii) identifying the patrimony of a debtor.
2. The Power of the Court to Supervise and Sanction
While 57.6% of respondents expressed their opinion that Mex-
ican law provides judges with an amount of power sufficient for
the purpose of enforcing judgments, 46.4% of the same overall pool
of respondents indicated that Mexican courts did not have the
30. This problem is not apparently limited to the issue of the enforcement of
judgments. When populist social groups recently invaded the national congress -
breaking down the doors that had been barricaded by federal representatives
wielding fire extinguishers and parading a horse around the floor of the main
legislative chamber - it took police five hours to make the scene (by which time most
of the protestors had fled). Daniel Lizarraga, Atropellan al Congreso, REFORMA, Dec.
11, 2002, at 1A.
31. See Table I.
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legal power required to effectively issue civil or penal sanctions
against individuals or entities that acted in disobedience of validly
taken decisions.2 Penalties currently imposed by Mexico's courts
are not, in the view of the majority of respondents (56.8%), consid-
ered to be important compliance incentives.
3. Administrative and Procedural Obstacles to the
Enforcement of Judgments
The principal administrative and/or procedural obstacle to
the enforcement of judgments in Mexico entails, according to
33.9% of survey respondents, the congested nature of court dock-
ets. This perception is entirely in line with statistics compiled by
the Consejo de la Judicatura (Judiciary Council) and other enti-
ties associated with the administration of justice in Mexico. Pur-
suant to the Supreme Court's 2000 Informe de Labores (Labor
report), the combined caseload ("carga de trabajo")34 of the federal
Tribunales Colegiados de Circuito (Board of Circuit Committees),
Tribunales Unitarios de Circuito (Board of Circuit Unitaries), and
Juzgados de Distrito (District Courts) increased between 1995 and
2000 from 426,012 to 537,330 matters. 5 This upswing in court
caseloads has occurred in spite of the public policy driven increase
in the overall number of federal Tribunales (both Colegiados and
Unitarios) and Juzgados from 335 in 1998 to 494 in 2002.36
The second most significant administrative and/or procedural
obstacle to enforcing judgments in Mexico involves, pursuant to
the perception of 18.5% of respondents, the existence of excessive
procedural delays. Not surprisingly, attorneys (15.5%) were
almost five times more likely than judges (3.2%) to have this per-
32. See Table I.
33. Annex II, supra note 4.
34. The carga de trabajo includes matters existing at the start of a measuring
period plus all new cases presented during the same period.
35. SCJN, Informe de Labores 2000: Anexo Estadistico, at http://www.scjn.gob.mx
(last visited Dec. 12, 2002). The carga de trabajo of Mexico's federal courts increased
between 2000 and 2001 from 537,2000 to 600,487 matters. Victor Fuentes, Debe
Poder Judicial Seguir su Expansi6n, REFORMA, Dec. 12, 2002, at 12A.
36: Victor Fuentes, Debe Poder Judicial Seguir su Expansi6n, REFORMA, Dec. 12,
2002, at 12A. The budgetary shortcomings Mexico has experienced over the course of
the last years threaten to curb the government's ability to overcome the problems
associated with an ever-expanding backlog of cases through the creation of additional
courts. SCJN, Por Limitaci6n Presupuestal, Retardo en la Soluci6n de Casos en
Tribunales Federales: Consejero Arag6n, Press Release No. 496, Jan. 25, 2002, at
http://www.scjn.gob.mx (last visited Dec. 14, 2002). The 2000 budget for Mexico's
federal courts (13 billion pesos) constituted approximately 1% of the total federal
budget. UNSR, supra note 27, at 14.
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spective 7 When asked about the average length of time required
for the enforcement of a local judgment, 58.9% of respondents pro-
vided estimates falling within the range of one to three plus
years. 8 The reason for these long averages is likely related to the
strong (69.4%) respondent perception regarding the availability of
mechanisms (popularly referred to as "chicanas") that can be used
by debtors to prolong the judicial enforcement process.39 This
inference is, in turn, corroborated by the abundance of explana-
tions given to the IFES-CIDE team of investigators regarding the
willingness of attorneys to use the complex amparo as a device for
accomplishing both legal and extra-legal objectives. The United
Nations Special Rapporteur investigating the issues of judicial
independence and impunity in Mexico noted, in a similar vein, the
existence of the "impression" that "the amparo procedures are
often abused."4° The availability and use of these procedures, the
Special Rapporteur further observed, "leads to long delays in the
final resolution of a case, resulting in expense and insecurity for
the other party."41 Other theories that have been advanced in
explanation of the generally protracted nature of Mexican legal
proceedings can, in part, be traced back to Mexico's Ibero-Romano
legal heritage. In the words of a former Mexican Assistant Attor-
ney General:
It is often stated that delay in the administration of justice is
equivalent to a denial of justice. If this is so, Mexico is plagued
with denials ofjustice. An excessive formalism in the proceedings,
indolence on the part of the judges and judicial officers, and the
37. Annex II, supra note 4.
38. See Table I.
39. Id.
40. UNSR, supra note 27, at 34. The correctness of this observation is, in the eyes
of the Special Rapporteur, underscored by the low percentage of amparos that are
actually upheld. Other investigations have reached the same conclusion. A CIDAC
investigation, for example, found that 77% of all amparo suits filed in 1992 were
dismissed, frequently on a procedural technicality. See Michael C. Taylor, Why No
Rule of Law in Mexico? Explaining the Weakness of Mexico's Judicial Branch, 27
N.M.L. REV. 141, 155 (1997).
41. UNSR, supra note 27, at 34. The absence of an obligatory code of professional
responsibility or ethics effectively frees Mexican attorneys from the prospect of
meaningful disciplinary action by a judge as well as the threat of a malpractice suit by
a disgruntled client. This practice situation substantially opens the door to the filing
of groundless, frivolous, or bad faith pleadings. It is duly noted that Mexico's C6digo
Penal para el Distrito Federal does have a title addressing "professional
responsibility," the second chapter of which does set forth "Delitos de Abogados"
(Criminal Offenses Pertaining to Lawyers). C6D. PEN. D.F. (Mex. 1931). These
provisions are, in reality, almost never used to shape lawyer conduct, largely due to
the elevated difficulty of proving up a criminal allegation.
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activities of certain litigious lawyers who are used to taking
advantage of the sluggishness in the administration of justice are
the main causes of this situation.42
As for those respondents who felt that a Mexican judgment
could be enforced within less than one year, judges outnumbered
attorneys at a rate of greater than two-to-one. The majority of
respondents (41.9%) considered the existence of administrative
and/or procedural delays to be a disincentive with respect to the
use of the judicial system for the enforcement of judgments.43
4. Political, Cultural and Socio-Economic Obstacles to the
Enforcement of Judgments in Mexico
The principal obstacle of a political, cultural, and/or socio-eco-
nomic nature to the enforcement of judgments in Mexico according
to 50.0% of respondents is debtor insolvency.44 The basic unwill-
ingness of debtors to voluntarily comply with their obligations rep-
resents, in the opinion of 35.5% of respondents, the second most
significant obstacle of a political, cultural, and/or socio-economic
nature to the enforcement of judgments in Mexico. 45 These obser-
vations are consistent with estimates made to IFES-CIDE investi-
gators during qualitative interviews indicative of a 5-20% rate of
good faith judgment compliance by debtors.4 s
5. Bribes and Illegal Payments
Quite surprisingly - especially in light of the abundance of
comments made during qualitative interviews to the contrary47 - a
majority (62.9%) of survey respondents indicated that bribes and
illegal payments do not constitute an important obstacle to the
judgment enforcement process in Mexico.48 Focusing, alterna-
tively, on those respondents that did see bribery and illegal pay-
ments as constituting an important obstacle, attorneys
42. Rafael Estrada Samano, Administration of Justice in Mexico: What Does the
Future Hold?, at http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/usmxlaw/usmjnm4.htm (last visited
Dec. 12, 2002) (hereinafter "Future").
43. Annex II, supra note 4.
44. See Table I.
45. Annex II, supra note 4.
46. Id.
47. IFES-CIDE investigators were, for example, told in more than one qualitative
interview of the necessity of tipping actuarios, notwithstanding the fact that they
receive a regular salary from the justice system. In a similar vein, both judges and
attorneys noted that police could not be counted on to do their job absent the payment
of a supplemental incentive.
48. See Table I.
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outweighed judges at a rate of greater than two-to-one. It is prob-
able that this discrepancy in perception as between attorneys and
judges reflects a latent sensitivity on the part of the latter deriv-
ing from the United Nations Special Rapporteur's observation
that:
[Tihe establishment of a culture of judicial independence has
been slow. Impunity arn d corruption appear to have continued
unabated. Whatever the changes and reforms, they are not seen
in reality. Public suspicion, distrust, and want of confidence in
the institutions of the administration in general and the adminis-
tration of justice in particular are still apparent.49
The same report goes on to note that despite the fact that an esti-
mated "50 to 70 percent of all judges at the federal level... [are]
corrupt[, ... no federal judge has ever been sanctioned for corrup-
tion .... 50
The stages of the judgment enforcement process perceived as
being most prone to bribery and/or illegal payments include (i) the
notification of the debtor, (ii) the attachment of a debtor's prop-
erty, and (iii) the sale by public auction of a debtor's property.
6. Informational Obstacles to the Enforcement of
Judgments
Survey respondents were generally of the opinion that Mex-
ico's legal system provides adequate mechanisms for the location
of a debtor's property (55.6% of respondents were either entirely
or partially of this view).51 More specifically, 51.6% of respondents
expressed their belief that Mexico's system for the recording of
interests in real property functioned acceptably well for the pur-
pose of identifying and executing on the non-movable patrimony of
49. UNSR, supra note 27, at 4.
50. Id. at 18. While it might be the case that no federal judge in Mexico has been
sanctioned for the specific offense of corruption (likely due to the intrinsic difficulty of
successfully proving up same), it has been reported that in 2002 the Consejo de la
Judicatura (i) received sixty-one administrative complaints and nineteen
denouncements and (ii) issued seventy-four administrative sanctions, forty-seven
private warnings, three public warnings, fifteen private admonishments, fourteen
public admonishments, five suspensions, four destitutions, and two inhabilitations.
True to traditional Mexican disclosure practices, the statistics were vague as to
whether these actions had been taken against judges (as opposed, for example, to
lower functionaries) as well as with respect to the nature of the underlying issue.
Abel Barajas, Ven en la Justicia Factor de Inversi6n, REFORMA, Dec. 14, 2002, at 12A
(reporting statistics supplied in an interview with the President of Mexico's Supreme
Court) (hereinafter "Inversion").
51. Annex II, supra note 4.
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a debtor." An even larger percentage - 73.4 - of respondents indi-
cated that it was possible to obtain information regarding a
debtor's place of work through the public registries.53 These obser-
vations are in line with the observation of survey respondents that
the registries of real property and gravamenes (mortgages, liens,
and embargoes) constitute the most reliable and cost effective
sources of information regarding the patrimony of debtors.
In the minority of cases that respondents were of the opinion
that Mexico's public registries could not be reliably consulted,
administrative efficiency and difficulty of access were cited,
respectively, as the largest and second largest problems. The
pending launch of the Sistema Integral de Gestion Registral (here-
inafter "SIGER"), a disintermediated, automated, and integrated
online public registry system, promises to do much to mitigate the
aforementioned issues of operational and information failure.54
Finally, it is important to recognize that these observations
are only relevant to those situations in which a debtor and his or
her property are formally registered in one or more of Mexico's
public registries. Again, it must be recalled that the commercial
and/or transactional reality of many of Mexico's citizens is
grounded firmly in the informal economy. To the extent that the
majority of assets associated with the informal economy are (i)
governed by extra-legal "rules" and practices and (ii) untitled and/
or unregistered," the above described mechanisms will be
ineffectual.
7. Obstacles Associated with the Embargo Process
Most of the steps involved in the embargo process do not, in
the opinion of a majority of respondents, pose an obstacle to the
enforcement of judgments in Mexico. More specifically, large per-
centages of respondents indicated that they had not, in their expe-
rience, encountered (i) difficulty in securing the services of a
reliable actuario, 5 (ii) the deliberate scuttling or devaluation of
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. SE, Avances del Programa de Modernizaci6n Registral, at http://www.secofi-
ssci.gob.mxl (last visited Dec. 15, 2002). This online resource will be akin to the
online UCC filing systems maintained by American states (for example, the "SOS
Direct," available at http://www.sos.state.tx.us/corp/sosda.index.shtml).
55. MYSTERY, supra note 1, at 156.
56. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 37.1% and 12.9% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "1" or "2."
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embargoed property,57 (iii) problems stemming from the non-actu-
alzed state of property registries,58 (iv) the bad faith manipulation
of code based exemptions for the purpose of avoiding an embargo,5 9
or (v) inflation driven decreases in property value occasioned by
administrative and/or legal delays in the process.6 ' Those aspects
of the embargo process that were, on the other hand, identified as
being problematic include the actual localization of a debtor's
property,6 1 the perceived weakness of the courts in terms of sanc-
tioning bad faith or fraudulent transfers, 62 and the overall slow-
ness of the embargo process.
8. Obstacles Associated with the Remate Process
Survey respondents expressed a generally favorable view of
the remate phase of the judgment enforcement process. In this
connection, the great majority of respondents indicated that it was
not difficult to obtain an "auto de aprobacion del remate" (i.e., a
court order in support of a sale by public auction),' give the
required notice to a debtor,6 establish priority amongst the poten-
57. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "' signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 25.0%, 21.0%, and 29.0% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "1," "2," or "3."
58. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 20.2% and 20.2% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "1" or "2."
59. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 33.9%, 16.9%, and 26.6% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "1," "2," or "3."
60. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 31.5%, 22.6%, and 25.0% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "1," "2," or "3."
61. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 21.0% and 35.5% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "4" or "5."
62. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 15.3% and 37.1% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "4" or "5."
63. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 14.5% and 18.5% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "4" or "5." Within this overall range of scores, attorneys tended to
be more critical than judges, the former group having an average score of 3.28 as
compared to the latter's 2.14.
64. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 57.3% and 18.5% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "1" or "2."
65. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 41.1% and 23.4% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "1" or "2."
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66tially competing claims of creditors, or secure an expert
appraisal of the property in issue.67 These positive perceptiorls
were, however, offset, by the large percentages of respondents
that expressed concern regarding the overall slowness of the
remate process 68 and the low probability of recovering through the
sale by public auction of a debtor's property. 9
V. CONCLUSION
A. The Existence of a Functional Legal System
Premised on the Rule of Law Will Conduce to the
Consolidation of Democracy and the Completion of
Mexico's Political and Economic Transition
Mexico today finds itself in one of the most difficult positions
it has encountered since the so-called "lost decade" of the 1980s.
Over the course of the past five to eight years, economic, political,
and social factors such as the slowdown in the global economy, a
generally soft international market for oil prices, the emergence of
cheaper sources of labor,"° declining rates of worker productivity, 1
66. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 64.5% and 10.5% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "1" or "2."
67. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of"1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 31.5%, 25.8%, and 23.4% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "1," "2," or "3."
68. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 16.9% and 15.3% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "4" or "5." Within this overall range of scores, attorneys tended to
be more skeptical than judges, the former group having an average score of 3.24 as
compared to the latter's 1.97.
69. Using a scale of 1-5 (where a score of "1" signifies "No Problem" and a score of
"5" signifies "Large Problem"), 14.5% and 25.8% of respondents answered,
respectively, with a "4" or "5." Within this overall range of scores, attorneys tended to
be more pessimistic than judges, the former group having an average score of 3.31 as
compared to the latter's 2.77.
70. iMdxico se Desmaquila?, VERTIGO, Jan. 6, 2002, at 55 (noting reports that
many U.S. companies are abandoning their Mexican maquila operations in favor of
China, where labor rates are as low as $0.25 per hour); Mathew Gower and Noel
Randewich, Mexico's 50 Most Prestigious Foreign Companies, Bus. MEX., July 2002, at
43 (stating that "the recent entry of China, with its cheap labor and attractive tax
incentives, into the World Trade Organization poses an additional threat to Mexico's
investment appeal"); The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Briefings: Mexico, at
http://www.economist.com/countries/Mexico/profile.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2002)
(reporting that the hourly cost of labor in Mexico has risen from U.S.$1.14 in 1998 to
U.S.$1.70 in 2001).
71. Ernesto Sarabia and Lilia Carrillo, Estanca a Mdxico Falta de Reformas,
REFORMA, Apr. 22, 2002, at 1A (noting that the level of worker productivity in Mexico
has fallen from 9.9 in 1994 to 0.4 in 2001).
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the continued shortage of accessibly priced commercial credit,72
the explosion of gang run piracy operations," rising levels of crim-
inal74 and narcotrafficking activity,75 the failure of the government
72. As of 2002, only an estimated 35% of the economically active component of
Mexico's population has access to credit. Fernando Pedrero, Logran Pocos Tener
Crddito, REFORMA, May 3, 2002, at 3A (citing statistics from the Comisi6n Nacional
para la Protecci6n y Defensa de los Usuarios de Servicios Financieros). The only
sources of financing available to informally operated micro- and small-size
businesses, on the other hand, are the loans sharks of the informal credit market.
With interest accruing at up to 20% a day, such loans offer little in terms of a
practical financing solution.
73. The protection of intellectual property rights in Mexico continues to be a major
problem. Notwithstanding the fact that Mexico was taken off the USTR's Special 301
Watch List in 2000 (and stayed off in 2001), 2002 saw a "significant increase in the
level of piracy . . . coupled with a decrease in the level of enforcement ... " USTR,
2002 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, at http://www.ustr.
gov/reports/nte/2002/mexico.PDF (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). In this connection, the
IIPA reports that copyright piracy in Mexico increased from U.S.$469 million in 1998
to in excess of U.S.$800 million in 2001. IIPA, IIPA Comments on Special 301 Out-of-
Cycle Review on Mexico, 67 Fed. Reg. 63186, at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_Oct30_
MexicoOCR.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). Speaking, in turn to Mexico's
enforcement problem, the IIPA states that "the ratio in Mexico of the number of
actual convictions for piracy relative to the number of raids is one of the world's
lowest (1.3%)." IIPA, Mexico Country Report, at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/1999/rbc_
mexico_301_99.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). It has been estimated that a
reduction in software piracy from Mexico's current rate of 60% to 25% would generate
an additional 32,500 jobs and U.S.$365 million in tax revenue.
74. Pablo Hiriart, Secuestro: Negocio con Mayor Garantia de Pxito en Mdxico, LA
CRONICA DEL Hoy, Jan. 7, 2002, at 4 (noting that between 1980 and 1994 the number
of "prolonged" kidnappings in Mexico increased from 140 to 300 per year; in contrast,
the number of "express" kidnappings committed each year in Mexico has risen to
approximately 10,000); Antonio Trejo and Marco Antonio Martinez, Hay Mas
Secuestros de Menores de Edad, ENFOQUE, Dec. 22, 2002, at 1 (reporting that the
number of child kidnappings in Mexico City increased from 41 in 1999 to 101 in 2002);
Daniel Millan and Jose Luis Tapia, Inhiben Secuestros La Inversi6n, Advierten
Embajadores a Creel, REFORMA, Jan. 8, 2002, at 6A (noting that concern over physical
security is adversely impacting foreign investment in Mexico); Hugo de la Torre,
Cambian Residencia por la Inseguridad, REFORMA, May 21, 2002, at 1A (noting that
security concerns are leading many wealthy Mexicans to relocate to the United
States); Francisco Gomez, Ciudad Juarez, Asesinatos de Mujeres: Mas Crimenes e
Impunidad, EL UNIVERSAL, Dec. 3, 2001 (reporting that over 360 female maquila
laborers have been either killed or disappeared along the border over the last decade);
Juan Carlos Cordova, La Vigilancia del Primer Mundo: Godoy, UNOMASUNO, Jan. 9,
2002, at 5 (noting Mexico is far from accomplishing the developed nation ratio of 1
policeman for every 200 citizens).
75. Richard Parker, Mexico's Poor Trading Machetes for AK-47s, at http://www.
abqjournal.com/news/drugs/ldrug5-12.htm (last visited June 14, 2001); Paige Bierna,
The Next Hot Export: Heroin - Farmers Turn Small Plots of Land Into Subsistence
Living with Mexican Black Tar, U.S./MEx. Bus., Oct. 1998, at 18 (noting that poor
farmers frequently find it more profitable to use their land for the cultivation of
marijuana or opium as opposed to maize and squash); Tim Coone, Dirty Laundry,
LATIN TRADE, Sept. 1997, at 56 (noting that as much as 5% of Mexico's GDP derives
from illicit activity); BILL WEINBERG, HOMAGE TO CHIAPAS 315 (2000) (relating that
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to resolve indigenous land claims76 and political issues,7 and the
persistence (if not subtle expansion) of guerilla movements" have
combined to eliminate economic growth,79 reduce exports,8" deci-
mate the tax base and other sources of government revenues,8 '
the U.S.$50 billion-a-year cross-border drug trade far outstrips Mexico's profits from
the sale of agricultural commodities or oil).
76. Gretchen Peters, In Mexico Hostage Crisis, Seeds of Unrest, at http://www.
csmonitor.com/2002/0715/pOlsO4-woam.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2002) (reporting
taking of hostages in government-peasant conflict involving expropriation of ejido
land for construction of new airport); Gretchen Peters, Mexico's Deadly Fight Over
Land, at http//www.csmonitor.com12002/0604/pO6sOl-woam.html (last visited Aug.
22, 2002) (reporting 2002 massacre of 26 peasants in Aguas Frias, Oaxaca); Claudio
Guerrero, Detecta CNC 30 Mil Conflictos por Tierras, REFORMA, June 11, 2002, at 6A;
Jesus Guerrero, Piden Ganadores Permiso para Armarse en Guerrero, REFORMA, Jan.
6, 2002, at llA.
77. Rebel Leader Blames Government for Mexico Massacre, at http://www.cnn.
com/WORLD/9712/24/mexico.massacre.pm/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2002) (reporting
1998 massacre of forty-five Indians at Acteal, Chiapas); Bill Weinberg, Fire in the
Sierra Madre: Mexico's Other War, at http://shadow.autono.net/sin00l/mexico.htm
(last visited Aug. 14, 2002) (reporting 1998 massacre of eleven peasants at El Charco,
Guerrero); Amnesty International, Mexico: Human Right Violations Still Continue
One Year After Guerrero Massacre, at http://web.amnesty.org (last visited Aug. 21,
2002) (noting 1995 massacre of seventeen peasants in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero);
Adan Garcia, Temen Mas Violencia en Michoacdn, REFORMA, July 3, 2002, at 2A
(reporting 2002 massacre of five peasants in Huecato, Michoacan).
78. Jorge Torres Jimenez, La Vida en la Clandestinidad, CAMBIO, Nov. 25, 2001,
at 40; Enrique Moran Monroy, Guerrilla en el DF, IMPACTO, Aug. 12, 2001, at 20;
Zeferino Garcia Sainz, El M6xico Bronco: 81 Grupos Armados, LA ExmTA, Aug. 19-25,
2001, at 1; Reaparece el EPR en Guerrero, EL FINANCIERO, Nov. 12, 2001, at 83; Sergio
Flores, Surge en Guerrero Otro Grupo Armado, REFORMA, May 23, 2002, at 14A;
Joshua Paulson, Rural Rebellion in Southern Mexico, NACLA REP. AM., Mar.-Apr.
2000, at 26; Linda Robinson and Lucy Conger, Mexico's New Revolution, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 1994, at 40 (noting that the Mexican Attorney general is
monitoring guerilla bands in ten states including Guerrero, Hidalgo, Morelos,
Michoacan, and Chiapas).
79. Mexico's rate of GDP growth fell from 6.6% in 2000 to -0.3% in 2001. World
Bank, Mexico Data Profile, at http://devdata.worldbank.org (last visited Dec. 20,
2002).
80. The total value of Mexican exports dropped from 166,454.8 (millions of dollars)
in 2000 to 119,595.9 (millions of dollars) in 2002. SE, Exportaciones Totales de
Mdxico, at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/nueva-snci/Estad stica/Expmx.htm (last
visited Dec. 20, 2002).
81. Government revenue flows are adversely effected by (i) Mexico's excessive
dependence on the sale of oil, (ii) decreased levels of international tourism, (iii) the
exodus of working age citizens to the United States, (iv) high levels of tax evasion, and
(v) the SAT's losing tax litigation record. Rosio Vargas and Victor Rodriguez-Padilla,
Mexico's International Oil Diplomacy, VOICES MEX., Apr.-June 1999, at 59 (noting
that PEMEX supplies from 30% to 40% of all tax revenues); SECTUR, El Turismo en
Mdxico 2001, at http://datatur.sectur.gob.mx/prov/TurMex2001.pdf (last visited Dec.
20, 2002) (noting that Mexico experienced a 4% decrease in inbound tourism between
2000 and 2001); Mund Americas, Remittances from Mexicans in the U.S. to Mexico -A
Kind of Bank for the Popular Economy, OPINION REPORT NUMBER 18, SERIES 2, July
2002, at 1 (noting that remittances from Mexicans working abroad amounted to
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drive up unemployment rates,82 swell the ranks of the informal
sector, diminish individual salary and consumer purchasing
power, 3 accentuate the gap between rich and poor,84 spawn record
levels of out migration,85 undermine the willingness of foreign
technology companies to introduce their IP sensitive products into
the local market, decrease foreign direct investment, 6 and lower
U.S.$10.2 billion in 2001 and are now the third largest source of foreign currency for
the national economy); Victor Fuentes, Reprueba Mdxico en Sistema Fiscal, REFORMA,
July 27, 2002, at 1 (noting findings of World Bank study indicating that an estimated
1.9 million Mexicans evade their annual tax obligations); Armando Talamantes,
Pierde Hacienda el 64% de los Juicios en su Contra, REFORMA, May 16, 2002, at 1A
(reporting that as of the first trimester of 2002, the SAT had lost 6,138 out of a total
of 9,620 litigated tax controversies).
82. The general rate of open unemployment increased from 2.2 to 2.4 between
2000 and 2001. INEGI, Tasa General de Desempleo Abierto Anual, at http:l
dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-winbdi.exe (last visited Dec. 20, 2002). Ernesto Sarabia,
Cae 17% Empleo en Maquila, REFORMA, June 18, 2002, at 1A (citing INEGI statistics
that 219,188 maquila sector jobs were lost over the course of the last year).
83. The national Consumer Price Index increased from 100 in 1994 (index base) to
323.8291 in 2000. HUoo ORTIZ DIETZ, MPxico: BANCO DE DATOs 2000 L-5 (2000). The
price of the basic food basket in Mexico has increased approximately 400% over the
last six years Garance Burke, Here Comes the Tax Man, MB, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 14;
Cecilia Gonzalez, Superan Cifras de Pobreza Mediciones Internacionales, REFORMA,
Aug. 15, 2002, at 11A (reporting SEDESOL statistics that 53.7 million Mexicans live
in poverty).
84. Enrique Iglesias, Advantages and Risks of Globalization: The Case of Latin
America, at http://www.globalpress.org/ingles/Washington/iglesias.html (last visited
July 29, 2002) (pointing out that the phenomenon of globalization has not had
"parallel consequences in the distribution of income and in the narrowing of the gap
between those at the top and those at the bottom"); Carrie A. Meyer, Globalization
and Inequality in Latin America, at http://mason.gmu.edu/-cmeyer/inequality.htm
(last visited July 29, 2002) (noting that all Latin Gini coefficients exceed the global
average of 0.4); Miguel Szekely, Desigualdad, NEXOS, Jan. 2002, at 18 (noting that
Mexico's exaggerated levels of income inequality have remained relatively constant
since 1992); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 86 (2002)
(noting that the top thirty percent of Mexico's population has benefited from the
liberal economic policies of the "Washington Consensus" at the expense of those at the
bottom).
85. The estimated number of Mexican citizens living in the United States
increased from 7.3 to 13.7 million between 1996 and 2002. CONAPO, Migraci6n
Mdxico-Estados Unidos: Presente y Futuro, at http://www.conapo.gob.mx/presente/
cap06n.htm (last visited July 3, 2001); M.ximo Kuri, Transforman al Mundo
Fen6meno Migratorio, REFORMA, Aug. 25, 2002, at 28A.
86. ECLAC Report, Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean Falls,
at http://www.eclac.cl (last visited July 29, 2002) (noting decline in FDI in Latin
America from U.S.$105 billion in 1999 to U.S.$80 billion in 2001); CNIE, Informe
Estadistico Sobre el Comportamiento de la Inversi6n Extranjera Directa en Mdxico, at
http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/nueva-snci/Inversi-n/Estad-sticas-inv/02-jun.pdf
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (reporting dramatic decline in FDI in Mexico for the first
half of 2002); Juan Carlos Orozco and Victor Ortiz, Pierde Atractivo Mdxico, REFORMA,
Sept. 24, 2002 (noting that Mexico slipped 17% between 2001 and 2002 in A.T.
Kearney's annual Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index).
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Mexico's overall position of global competitiveness."
As the country struggles to take the steps necessary for the
consolidation of its nascent democracy, the completion of its pro-
tracted process of economic and political transition, and its effec-
tive participation in the global economy - namely, the reformation
of obsolete legislation and regulations, the realization of struc-
tural adjustments, the transformation of the public administra-
tion, and, most importantly, the creation of political party
transcending "pactos" (i.e., pacts)8 - the existence of a functional
and efficient judicial system premised on a fundamental respect
for the rule of law is more important than ever. These contentions
are in line with the observations and comments of judicial authori-
ties, legal scholars, and international organizations. Referring,
for example, to the correlation between the rule of law and
national development, the President of Mexico's Supreme Court
recently stated "confidence in the notion of justice, in judges, and
in our laws is fundamental to Mexican and foreign investors' con-
tinued promotion of the country's economic development and gen-
eration of employment." 9 U.S. constitutional scholar Lawrence
87. Mexico - along with most other Latin nations - received a low ranking in the
World Economic Forum's "Competitiveness Report" due to its "structural weaknesses
in areas like rule of law and public institutions, as well as on innovation and
absorption of technologies." Klaus Schwab and Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Latin American
Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, at http://www.weforum.org (last visited Dec. 8,
2001) (Mexico's "competitiveness" ranking was forty-three in a total field of seventy-
five nations). In a similar vein, Mexico was ranked forty-one (out of a sample of forty-
nine nations) in the IMD's 2002 "Global Competitiveness Report." This ranking
represents an eight-place drop relative to 2000 and puts Mexico behind Chile (twenty)
and Brazil (thirty-five). IMD, IMD World Competitiveness Scorecard 2002, at http://
www0l.imd.ch/documents/wcy/content/pastranking.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002);
Laura Carrillo, Pide UNCTAD Crear Competitividad, REFORMA, Apr. 30, 2002, at 1A
(noting that absent an increased level of competitiveness, Mexico will be one of the
countries most adversely effected by China's entry into the WTO).
88. CESAR CANSINO, LA TRANSICI6N MEXICANA: 1997-2000, 1-246 (2000) (noting
that no Latin government has succeeded in accomplishing a significant political and!
or economic transition without first having established a formal consensus amongst
dominant interest groups); Joel Estudillo Rendon, Back to the Future: Will the Dark
Forces of Mexico's Past Hijack Mexico's Democratic Transition?, Bus. MEX., Jan. 2002,
at 23 (noting that it is "worrisome" that those responsible for Mexico's "political
change have not been capable of establishing the basic agreements that would carry
through a real transformation of the political regime"); Claudio Guerrero, Buscan
Acuerdo; Luego la Reforma, REFORMA, Aug. 22, 2002, at 1; Wilbert Torre, Las
Diferencias No Nos Asustan, REFORMA, May 28, 2002, at 2A (noting that Mexico's
transition should be "pactado"); Maribel Gonzalez, Evitan Dar por Hecho Democracia
en Mdxico, REFORMA, Apr. 17, 2002, at 8A (noting Dael Baer's preoccupation with
Mexican government's inability to "generate consensus"); Andres Oppenheimer,
Mdxico Tiene un Grave Caso de Pardlisis Politica, REFORMA, July 23, 2002, at 22A.
89. Inversion, supra note 50 (quoting Genaro G6ngora Pimentel).
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Lessig has similarly emphasized the elemental importance of this
correlation, noting that "if anything makes an economy work, it is
a stable political environment governed by the rule of law."90 This
perspective is, moreover, shared by the World Bank. "Unreliable
Judiciaries," a 1999 report prepared by that organization alleges,
"hinder development, discourage and distort trade, and foster cor-
ruption."9' Turning, finally, to the inter-relationship between the
rule of law and the florescence of democratic institutions and prac-
tices, the President of Mexico's Supreme Court has flatly asserted
that "there can be no solid democracy in Mexico without a strong
and independent federal judicial power."
92
Notwithstanding the many observations of a generally posi-
tive nature made by respondents with respect to the effectiveness
of the procedures and mechanisms available for the enforcement
of judgments (summarized in Table 1), Mexico's legal system has
yet to become an unqualified source of legal certainty, impartial-
ity, institutional transparency, citizen confidence, and social-gov-
ernmental stability. As one legal commentator relates in this
regard, the "administration and procreation of justice in Mexico,
as well as the respect for the rule of law and the observance of
human rights, is quite distant from fulfilling the high principles
and noble purposes set forth in the Mexican Constitution."93 The
detrimental consequences associated with this reality are, in turn,
borne out in the findings of surveys94 and studies 95 which reveal
that perceptions of judicial corruption and inefficiency are wide-
spread amongst Mexicans.
B. Specific Recommendations
Taking the foregoing quantitative data and qualitative infor-
mation into consideration and, with an eye to facilitating the
ongoing process of strengthening Mexico's legal system in general
90. Lawrence Lessig, The Rules of Law, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec. 11, 2000, at 51.
91. John Otis, The Clamor to Clean Up Latin America's Judiciary is Growing, at
http://www.latintrade.com/archives/june97/lawl.html (last visited Mar. 4, 1999).
92. G6ngora: Gobernar con Democracia Requiere de un Orden Juridico Legal y
Legitimo, at httpJ/vlex.com/mx/actualidad//1004 (last visited June 25, 2001).
93. Future, supra note 42.
94. U.S. Dep't of State, Mexico Country Report on Human Rights Practice for 1996,
at http://www3.itu.ch/missions/us/hrc/mexico.html (last visited Mar. 4, 1999).
95. Juan Antonio Zuniga, El Sistema de Seguridad y Justicia, al Servicio de la
Delincuencia: SSP, LA JORNADA, Jan. 11, 2002, at 42 (reporting findings of study
conducted by the Secretaria de Seguridad Publica characterizing the Mexican judicial
system as formalistic, slow, corrupt, free from accountability, and willing to serve the
interests of the governing class and organized delinquency).
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and judgment enforcement procedures and mechanisms in partic-
ular, IFES-CIDE presents the following recommendations:
1. Make More Effective Use of Negotiation and
Mediation:
Negotiation and mediation9" are, as currently practiced in
Mexico, relatively unstructured processes conducted, typically, by
the judge presiding over a controversy. Mexican negotiation and
mediation practices have, historically, known very low success
rates. Negotiation and mediation practices which are, alterna-
tively, premised on the use of a third party neutral (i.e., one that is
not also the judge assigned to a matter) and structured procedures
have proven to be highly effective alternatives to litigation.97 The
future introduction of an adequate legislative framework9" and the
adoption of a more standardized and formal approach to negotia-
tion and mediation99 will, in all likelihood, permit Mexico's legal
system to resolve a greater number of cases more rapidly, thereby
contributing to the conservation of scarce judicial resources, free-
ing up of dockets, and sparing individual parties the time, trouble,
and expense of engaging in litigation.
2. Launch SIGER:
Mexico's traditional "paper and ink" based registry systems
are prone to (i) human error, (ii) information loss, destruction, and
manipulation, and (iii) administrative delay. The forthcoming
launch of the SIGER will improve the operation of Mexico's regis-
try systems by expediting the process for ascertaining the exis-
tence of specific filings (for example, through the conduction of a
lien search), facilitating the online registration of liens, reducing
the likelihood of fraud and error, and enabling the establishment
of an integrated, searchable database of encumbered property.
These outcomes will, in turn, likely make it easier for creditors to
96. The term "conciliaci6n" is used in Mexico to refer to what a U.S. lawyer would
understand to be mediation.
97. Mediation centers in the United States have, for example, reported settlement
rates that reach as high as 70% and 80%.
98. In order for mediation to truly become an effective alternative to litigation,
Mexico's legislature must address the issues of session confidentiality and the
enforceability of mediated settlement agreements.
99. A growing number of Mexican government officials and judges believe that the
creation of professionally staffed alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") centers
offering, inter alia, state of the art (i.e., structured) mediation services will help
alleviate the country's docket congestion problems. Clara Ramirez, Respalda la PGR
Mediaci6n Judicial, REFORMA, May 6, 2002.
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carry out embargoes and remates and, on another level, provide
banks and merchants with the degree of certainty necessary for
entering into an increased number of lending or other economic
growth inducing transactions with an expanded range of clients
and/or partners.
3. Remedy Situations that Give Rise to Delays in the
Embargo Process:
The embargo process is, as reflected in the perceptions of sur-
vey respondents, subject to substantial delays. These delays can,
in the absence of a strong prosecutorial framework and will, be
exploited by debtors seeking to fraudulently transfer or otherwise
conceal their property. Steps that can be taken to remedy this
situation include (i) introducing procedures, mechanisms, and
incentives designed to shorten the time frame within which attor-
neys and actuaries undertake embargoes and (ii) creating and
implementing an effective mixture of legislative mechanisms and
performance based incentives for the purpose of securing more
reliable police assistance.
4. Follow Through on Proposed Program of Amparo
Reform:
The amparo action has, over time, evolved from being a mech-
anism used primarily for protecting individual citizens from the
unlawful acts and/or conduct of government officials into a signifi-
cant source of procedural delay and docket congestion. Referring
to this transformation, the United Nations Special Rapporteur
observed that "the present law regulating the amparo dates from
1936 and, in the opinion of many, including the Supreme Court,
no longer corresponds to the needs of modern society." °°
The Mexican Supreme Court prepared and submitted a series
of amparo related reform proposals to the national congress in
2001. The eventual enactment of these proposals into law would
be beneficial insofar as the existence of a simpler and more expedi-
tious amparo procedure could simultaneously contribute to the
reduction of extant docket congestion and bolster citizen confi-
dence in the government's capacity to administer justice.
100. UNSR, supra note 27, at 38.
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5. Make More Effective Use of Power to Investigate and
Sanction:
Fraudulent transfers of property, the bad faith use of dilatory
tactics, and corruption continue to constitute obstacles to the
enforcement of judgments in Mexico. In order to overcome the
impediment posed by this reality to the effective operation of the
rule of law, Mexico must better develop its underlying willingness
and overt power to investigate and sanction irregular or illegal
acts and/or conduct. Specific examples of action that can be taken
in this connection include (i) making a maximum good faith effort
to comply with the reporting and access to information require-
ments set forth in Mexico's Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso
a la Informaci6n Publica Gubernamental (hereinafter
"L.F.T.A."),' 01 thereby providing parties with a viable mechanism
for pursuing both institutional and individual accountability, (ii)
introducing tougher laws - in conjunction with more efficient and
realistic enforcement procedures and mechanisms - as a means of
discouraging fraudulent or bad faith property transfers, (iii) estab-
lishing a practically conceived, substantively meaningful, and uni-
form code of ethics and professional responsibility for the benefit
of the members of the Mexican legal profession (and their clients),
along with a functional enforcement mechanism, 102 and (iv) creat-
ing and implementing a practically conceived, substantively
meaningful, and uniform code of judicial ethics and conduct,
together with a functional enforcement mechanism. 10 3
6. Improve Security for At-Risk Judges and Lawyers:
Certain types of cases - for example, those involving narco-
trafficking and human rights issues - can entail a high degree of
risk (in terms of physical security) for Mexican judges and law-
yers. 104 Absent the existence of a reliable system of security, the
101. Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a Ia Informacifn Publica
Gubernamental, D.O., Jun. 11, 2002 (Mex. 2002).
102. In this regard the United Nations Special Rapporteur's report notes: "There is
no code of ethics for lawyers. The various bar associations have their own code of
ethics, breach of which may lead to expulsion of the member from the bar association.
But that does not preclude the lawyer from continuing to practice. The only way to
stop a lawyer from practicing is through the Ministry of Education, which can revoke
the license, a complicated procedure which is never implemented." UNSR, supra note
27, at 26.
103. The Mexico City office of the National Center for State Courts, a U.S. based
organization, is currently working with the Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito
Federal on such a code.
104. Jose Reveles, Larga Lista de Ejecuciones de Abogados y Jueces, EL
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making of threats or the use of violence can adversely impact the
impartiality and/or vigor with which judges and lawyers carry out
their professional functions. Mexico must, going forward, strive to
provide the members of the judiciary and legal profession with the
security necessary to ensure the exercise of their unfettered pro-
fessional judgment and determination with respect to the admin-
istration and pursuit of justice.
FINANCIERO, Nov. 19, 2001, at 74 (noting assignation of seventy-nine judges and legal
professionals in Mexico during the past ten years); Tim Golden, Mexican Judge is
Shot Dead, at http://www.latino.com/mexkil.html (last visited Mar. 4, 1999); Amnesty
International USA, Human Rights Defender Digna Ochoa, at http://www.
amnestyusa.org/womenldefenders/digna.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) (reporting
murder of prominent Mexican human rights advocate Digna Ochoa); Francisco
Rejendiz and Jose Navarro, Analiza Gobernaci6n como Proteger a Jueces, EL HERALDO
DE Mikxico, Nov. 14, 2001, at 1 (identifying connection between the assignation of
magistrates and narcotraficantes); Ignacio Aczaga, Seguridad para Magistrados,
Exigen a Fox, EL SOL DE MExico, Nov. 20, 2001, at 2A (noting supreme court's
rejection of Colombian-style "jueces sin rostros").
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TABLE 1




IssuE PERCENTAGE JUDGES ATTORNEYS
Mexico's legal system usually provides 47.2% 50.0% 42.1%
an effective means for recovering
judicially recognized debts
Judicial execution is the most effective 64.0% 62.5% 58.6%
means of enforcing judgments
The law provides Mexican judges with 57.6% N/A N/A
power sufficient for the purpose of
supervising the enforcement of
judgments
The roles and responsibilities of the 70.4% N/A N/A
entities involved in the process of
enforcing local judgments in Mexico are
clearly defined
Bribes and illegal payments are not an 62.9% 80.0% 53.6%
important obstacle to the enforcement of
judgments
Mexico's registry system constitutes an 51.6% N/A N/A
acceptable means of identifying, locating
and executing against a debtor's real
property
The principal legal obstacle to the 19.2% 12.5% 27.6%
enforcement of local judgments in Mexico
is the fraudulent transfer of property
The principal administrative or 33.9% 38.7% 36.2%
procedural obstacle to the enforcement of
local judgments in Mexico is the
congestion of Mexican court dockets
The principal political, cultural, or socio- 50.0% N/A N/A
economic obstacle to the enforcement of
local judgments in Mexico is debtor
insolvency
The number one reason not to pursue a 28.0% 31.3% 32.8%
judgment enforcement action in Mexico's
courts is cost
The Mexican entity which does not 60.0% N/A N/A
usually comply with its official
obligations is the police
Mexico's tribunals do not possess 46.4% N/A N/A
sufficient legal power to issue either civil
or criminal sanctions against those
parties which do not obey their decisions
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TAiLE 1 (CON'D)
The average period of time required to 58.9% 45.2% 74.2%
enforce a local judgment in Mexico is
between one to three years
Mexican law contains mechanisms which 69.4% N/A N/A
can be utilized by debtors to prolong the
judgment enforcement process
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ANNEX I
QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW CONDUCTED IN MEXICO CITY
DURING THE WEEK OF 28 OCTOBER - 1 NOVEMBER 2002
COURT
JUDGES MAGISTRATES OFFICILJS ATTORNEYS NGOs
Juez Sergio Mag. Rafael Sec. de Carlos Silvia
Higuera Mota, Avante Acuerdos Raul Loperena, Aguilera
Juzgado 4 Martinez, Calva Loperena, Garcia,
Civil Cuarta Sala Balderrama, Lerch y Comisi6n
Civil Juzgado 21 Martin del Mexicana de




Juez Fabiola Mag. Mario Carlos Garcia
Vargas Armando and Jorge
Villanueva, Vizquez Leon Orantes,
Juzgado 25 Galvn, Goodrich,
Civil Quinta Sala Riquelme y
Civil Asociados
Mag. Miguel Ruben
Alberto Reyes Minutti, Esq.
Anzures,
Quinta Sala
Civil
Alejandro
Ogarrio,
Ogarrio y
Diaz
Marco Tulio
Venegas, Von
Wobeser y
Sierra
John Rogers
and Adrian
Zubikarai,
Strasburger &
Price
Jose Luis
Zambrano,
Zambrano,
Rocha y
Espino
